Why the Brahmajāla Is Not a Rejection of Self

— How Bondage Arises from Identifying the Self with the World

I. Introduction — Correcting a Fundamental Misreading

The Brahmajāla Sutta (Brahma’s Teachings on Net), placed deliberately at the very opening of the Dīgha Nikāya, has long been approached as a sweeping rejection of the self. In many modern readings, it is taken to represent the Buddha’s decisive move away from any notion of selfhood, laying the groundwork for later formulations that treat “no-self” as an absolute metaphysical truth. This interpretation has powerfully shaped contemporary Buddhism, often pushing it toward no-self absolutism and, in some cases, toward a quiet form of nihilism where liberation is implicitly understood as the erasure of self altogether.

Such a reading, however influential, rests on a fundamental misunderstanding of what the Buddha is actually doing in DN 1. It confuses a diagnosis of bondage with a denial of self. The sutta does not set out to negate selfhood as such, nor does it propose non-existence as a liberative solution. Instead, it undertakes a careful exposure of how beings become trapped in the world through a particular mode of identification.

The Brahmajāla Sutta catalogues sixty-two views, all of which revolve around the self and the world: their origin, duration, extent, and destiny. What unites these views is not that they affirm a self, but that they bind the self to the world (loka). Through speculative reasoning grounded in experience, feeling, craving, and attachment, the self is consistently identified within the world and made dependent upon it. This act of identification, sustained by clinging (upādāna), is what perpetuates bondage.

When this crucial distinction is overlooked, the sutta is misread as a philosophical treatise against self rather than what it actually is: a precise and penetrating analysis of world-bound identity. The Buddha’s concern is not the presence of views or even the presence of a sense of self, but the way views are used to anchor identity within the field of becoming. DN 1 therefore closes off an entire domain of speculation, not because selfhood is forbidden, but because the world is an unfit ground for liberation.

The thesis of this article follows directly from this clarification and can be stated plainly:

Bondage is not caused by having views, but by clinging to those views that identify the self with the world.

Read in this way, the Brahmajāla Sutta emerges not as a denial of self, but as a foundational safeguard of the Buddha’s liberative path—one that preserves the possibility of transcendence by refusing to let the self be defined by the world it must ultimately leave behind.

II. What the Brahmajāla Actually Catalogues

1. DN 1 as a Cartography of World-Binding Views

The Brahmajāla Sutta presents a systematic enumeration of sixty-two views current among ascetics and brāhmaṇas of the Buddha’s time. This enumeration is not incidental. The sutta does not stage a debate, does not pit schools against one another, and does not attempt to refute these views individually through logic or counter-argument. Instead, it maps them.

DN 1 functions as a cartography of a single domain: the domain of speculative identity within the world. The views are laid out comprehensively to show their full range and internal variations, but they are treated as belonging to one field of entrapment. By enclosing them together, the Buddha makes clear that their differences in expression are less important than their shared function. The sutta’s purpose is diagnostic: to reveal the terrain in which bondage operates, not to adjudicate which position within that terrain is correct.

2. The Common Structure of the Sixty-Two Views

Although the sixty-two views differ in formulation and sophistication, they all share the same structural core. Each view concerns:

the self (atta),
the world (loka),
and questions about the self’s origin, duration, extent, and destiny, always within the world.

Whether a view asserts that the self is eternal or annihilated, finite or infinite, conscious or unconscious after death, its underlying assumption remains unchanged. The self is consistently defined by the world, derived from the world, or projected into a form of worldly continuation. Even views that claim transcendence do so by extending the world upward or outward, rather than leaving it behind.

In this way, all sixty-two views bind identity to loka. They seek security, meaning, or permanence by refining the relationship between self and world, but never by questioning the world itself as the ground of identity. Their diversity masks a deeper uniformity: the self is always taken with the world.

3. The Psychological Origin of Those Views

DN 1 further clarifies that these views do not arise from detached philosophical reflection. Their origin is traced to a precise experiential sequence:

contact (phassa) → feeling (vedanā) → craving (taṇhā) → clinging (upādāna) → becoming (bhava).

Views emerge from worldly experience, shaped by sensation, affect, and desire. They are attempts to stabilize identity in response to pleasure, pain, fear, and uncertainty. What appears as metaphysical speculation is, at its root, a strategy for securing continuity within the world.

For this reason, the Buddha does not treat these views as mere intellectual errors. They are expressions of world-based attachment, crystallized into doctrines and then clung to as “who I am” or “what will become of me.” As long as identity is sought inside the world, view-making remains an instrument of becoming rather than a means of liberation.

Seen in this light, the Brahmajāla Sutta is not concerned with which views are right or wrong. It exposes how world-binding views arise, function, and perpetuate bondage, thereby preparing the ground for a path that does not seek identity within the world at all.

III. The Buddha’s Precision: Rejecting World-Binding Views, Not View Itself

The Brahmajāla Sutta is often misunderstood as a blanket condemnation of views. This misunderstanding leads to the assumption that the Buddha was urging practitioners to abandon all self-understanding, all orientation, and even all conceptual structure. DN 1 teaches nothing of the sort.

The sutta does not declare that “all views are bondage,” nor does it suggest that liberation requires the abandonment of any sense of direction or meaning. Such an interpretation would contradict the Buddha’s own teaching elsewhere, where he repeatedly affirms right view, right direction, refuge, and liberation as essential elements of the path. A teaching that required the abandonment of all views would undermine the very framework through which liberation is made intelligible.

The Buddha’s precision in DN 1 lies elsewhere. What is rejected is not view as such, but a specific class of views—those that bind the self to the world. The sixty-two views catalogued in the Brahmajāla all share this defining feature: they establish identity within loka, using the world as the ground, reference point, or guarantee of the self. Whether the self is imagined as eternal or annihilated, finite or infinite, conscious or unconscious after death, it is always positioned in relation to the world and made dependent upon it.

This is why the problem is not clinging to views per se, but clinging to those views that:

bind the self to the world,
establish identity within loka,
and thereby perpetuate becoming (bhava).

When such views are clung to, they function as instruments of continuity rather than liberation. They secure identity, but only at the cost of remaining within the field of aging, decay, and death. DN 1 exposes this mechanism with clarity, showing that no refinement of world-based identity—however subtle or elevated—can lead beyond the world itself.

Seen in this light, the Brahmajāla Sutta does not promote silence, confusion, or conceptual collapse. It performs a surgical exclusion. By rejecting world-binding views, it preserves the possibility of right orientation—an orientation that does not derive the self from the world, but instead points beyond it.

IV. The Meaning of the “Net” (Jāla) — Entrapment Within the World’s Jurisdiction

In the Brahmajāla Sutta, the image of a jāla—a net—points to something far more precise than conceptual confusion. A net does not merely ensnare ideas; it confines movement within a boundary. To be caught in a net is to remain trapped inside a defined domain, unable to exit no matter how one struggles or rearranges position.

This is the decisive point of the Brahmajāla.
The net represents the jurisdiction of the world (loka).

DN 1 shows that:

coarse views and subtle views,
material and immaterial views,
pessimistic and optimistic views,

all entrap in exactly the same way because they keep the self operating inside the world’s boundary. Their content differs, but their jurisdiction does not. Every one of the sixty-two views remains a view about the self within the world—its origin in the world, its duration in the world, or its fate after death in relation to the world.

A net traps not because of what the fish believes, but because it cannot cross the net’s edge. Likewise, a view entraps not because it is crude or refined, but because it cannot take the self beyond loka. Even the most elevated immaterial or eternalist views merely extend the world upward or outward; they do not exit it. They remain fully subject to the world’s law of becoming.

This is why the Buddha does not offer a “better” view inside DN 1. Any view that continues to answer the question “What am I in relation to the world?” is already inside the net. Changing answers within that framework is movement within the net, not escape from it.

The core insight of the Brahmajāla is therefore jurisdictional, not philosophical:

What the Brahmajāla traps is not the self, but the self confined within the world’s jurisdiction.

Bondage persists as long as identity remains world-referenced, world-derived, or world-guaranteed. DN 1 exposes this containment so that the practitioner may recognize the boundary itself. Liberation begins only when the question of self is no longer asked within the world, but is redirected toward that which lies beyond its jurisdiction.

V. Gocara — Ancestral Dwelling and the Question of Belonging

The Buddha’s teaching on gocara is often reduced to advice about mental restraint or suitable meditation objects. Such readings miss the depth and seriousness of the term. In the context illuminated by the Brahmajāla Sutta, gocara concerns where the self dwells according to its origin, not merely where attention happens to rest.

The word gocara is composed of two elements:

go — gotra, bloodline, lineage, ancestral origin
cara — movement, dwelling, conduct, way of living

Taken together, gocara means where one dwells according to one’s lineage. It answers a prior and more fundamental question than “What do I think?” or “What do I attend to?” It asks:
From which source does the self take nourishment, identity, and belonging?

World-Dwelling as Wrong Pasture

In DN 1, the Buddha identifies speculative engagement of self with the world as outside the bhikkhu’s gocara. All sixty-two views arise from—and remain confined within—the jurisdiction of the world (loka). They differ in doctrine, but they share one fatal assumption: that the world is the dwelling place of the self.

To dwell in the world is to accept the world as one’s identity—as if the self were born of the world, sustained by the world, and destined to remain within it. Whether this dwelling is expressed through materialist, eternalist, annihilationist, or immaterial views makes no difference. As long as identity is nourished by the world, the self remains subject to the world’s law: aging, decay, and death.

This is why DN 1 closes the belonging of self with the world entirely. It is not suppressing inquiry, nor denying selfhood. It is declaring that the world is the wrong dwelling-ground for the self. To live from the world is to live under death’s jurisdiction.

Ancestral Lineage as Right Dwelling

Gocara is therefore not emptiness, silence, or loss of orientation. It is ancestral dwelling—living in accordance with the true origin of the self. The self (atta, soul, citta) carries a Manussa source that is not native to the world. It does not arise from the world’s processes of becoming, nor is it sustained by them.

To dwell rightly is to abide with this ancestral source, not with the world. This is where brahmavihāra become decisive. They are called vihāra—abidings—because they are places of dwelling. They are called brahma because they are not worldly values, not born of worldly craving, domination, or survival. They align the self with a value-law that already stands beyond the world’s power-law.

Dwelling in brahmavihāra weakens world-identity, loosens attachment to worldly becoming, and restores alignment with the self’s non-worldly origin. They function as a right dwelling because they do not align the self with the world (loka).

Nibbāna-dhātu as the Final Home

If brahmavihāra represent ancestral alignment, Nibbāna-dhātu is the ancestral home. It lies entirely outside the jurisdiction of the world. Identifying the self with Nibbāna-dhātu does not bind it to a new view; it ends identification with the world altogether. This is why liberation is described as refuge, release, and exit—not annihilation.

The Core Distinction

The teaching of gocara in DN 1 thus rests on a simple but absolute distinction:

Dwelling with the world is bondage and death.
Dwelling with one’s ancestral source is freedom and liberation.

The Brahmajāla Sutta safeguards this distinction by closing the world-dwelling entirely. It does not negate the self. It protects the self from being bound by the wrong alignment. To remember one’s gocara is to remember where one truly belongs—and to live accordingly.

VI. Brahmavihāra as the Living Abode Beyond the World

The Brahmajāla Sutta closes all views that bind the self to the world. Yet it does not close the path of liberation, nor does it negate the Buddha’s repeated exhortation to cultivate the brahmavihāra. This distinction is essential.

The reason is simple: brahmavihāra do not belong to the world’s operating system.

Brahmavihāra Are Not World-Derived Identities

The sixty-two views catalogued in DN 1 arise from the world (loka). They are formed within its field of worldly contact, craving, clinging, and becoming. They attempt to stabilize identity inside the world.

Brahmavihāra function differently.

They are not identities constructed from worldly experience, nor are they refinements of ego. They do not arise from survival instinct, acquisition, domination, or fear of loss. They do not secure the self in the world.

They represent value-orientation, not world-position.

Power-Law vs. Value-Law

The world operates under a power-law:

to consume or be consumed,
to dominate or be dominated,
to survive at the expense of others (life force),
to perpetuate becoming through craving.

Fear, anger, competition, and identity-defense naturally arise within this system.

Brahmavihāra belong to a value-law that stands above the world’s power-law. They do not negotiate survival within loka; they transcend the self from loka’s logic altogether.

Because of this, brahmavihāra:

weaken worldly craving and attachment,
dissolve fear and anger rooted in survival anxiety,
undo egoic contraction,
and release the self from power-based reactivity.

Ego as the Interface Layer

The ego is not the self. It is the interface layer between the self and the world. Its function is adaptation, defense, negotiation, and survival within loka.

World-derived views strengthen this interface.

Brahmavihāra dissolve it.

By cultivating loving-kindness, compassion, rejoicing in Manussa, and transcendence, the self no longer needs to defend itself against the world. The interface collapses because the self is no longer trying to belong here.

Alignment, Not Attachment

This is the decisive point often misunderstood.

Identifying the self with world-based views binds the self.
Identifying the self with brahmavihāra values liberates it.

Why? Because brahmavihāra do not identify the self with the world. They align the self transcended from the world, toward its ancestral home.

They do not answer the question “Who am I in the world?”
They answer the deeper question:
“From where do I belong?”

Right View of Self Is Necessary

The Brahmajāla Sutta does not eliminate the need for the right view on self (atta, soul). It eliminates wrong self-view—specifically, any view that locates the self inside the world.

Right view of self consists in:

alignment with brahmavihāra as ancestral values,
orientation toward Nibbāna-dhātu as ancestral home,
and withdrawal from the world’s jurisdiction altogether.

Without this orientation, liberation has no direction. With it, the path becomes coherent, stable, and complete.

Conclusion

Brahmavihāra are not caught in the Net (world entrapment) because they do not belong to the world.

They do not refine bondage.
They undo worldly belonging.

They prepare the self for final refuge—not by denying selfhood, but by restoring the self to its true lineage and rightful destination beyond the world.

VII. Nibbāna-dhātu and the Meaning of Tathāgata — One Who Has Gone There

Nibbāna-dhātu Is Not a View, but a Realm Beyond the World

The culmination of the Buddha’s teaching is Nibbāna-dhātu, the Deathless realm beyond the jurisdiction of the world (loka). It is not a refinement of worldly existence, not a subtle continuation, and not a metaphysical theory competing with other theories catalogued in DN 1. It stands outside the field of speculation altogether.

This is why Nibbāna-dhātu does not appear among the sixty-two views. Those views all arise within the world—attempts to secure identity, meaning, or continuity under the world’s law of becoming. Nibbāna-dhātu lies beyond that law. It is not something to be thought about correctly; it is a destination to be reached by withdrawal from the world’s jurisdiction.

To orient the self toward Nibbāna-dhātu therefore does not bind it to a new worldly doctrine. It ends world-binding identification altogether. The self ceases to feed on the world and is no longer subject to the world’s rule of aging, decay, and death.

The Meaning of Tathāgata: Orientation Completed

The title Tathāgata is often left untranslated or mystified. Yet within this framework clarified by the Brahmajāla Sutta, its meaning becomes exact and practical.

Tathāgata means one who has gone there.

“Gone” (gata) indicates movement, direction, and completion.
“There” (tathā) refers not to a place within the world, but to the ancestral home beyond it.

A Tathāgata is one whose orientation is no longer mixed, provisional, or divided between world and beyond-world. The movement has been completed. The self no longer dwells in the wrong place, nor merely aligns with ancestral values—it abides in the ancestral home.

This is not annihilation. It is not silence for its own sake. It is arrival.

Refuge, Exit, and Home

Because Nibbāna-dhātu lies beyond the world’s jurisdiction, liberation is consistently described by the Buddha in directional language:

refuge (saraṇa),
release (vimutti),
exit from the world (nissaraṇa).

These are not metaphors. They describe a real change of domain. The self no longer belongs to the world; it no longer participates in the world’s cycles of becoming. The world’s laws no longer apply.

This is why identifying the self with Nibbāna-dhātu is not worldly clinging. It is the end of clinging to the world. Identity ceases to be negotiated under worldly conditions. The self stands free, stable, and complete.

The Coherence of the Path

Seen in this light, the entire structure of the Buddha’s teaching becomes coherent:

DN 1 closes world-binding views.
Gocara restores ancestral dwelling.
Brahmavihāra align the self with non-worldly value-law.
Nibbāna-dhātu is the final home beyond the world.
The Tathāgata is one who has gone there.

Nothing in this trajectory requires denial of the self. What is denied—decisively and completely—is the world’s claim over the self.

Final Clarification

The Brahmajāla Sutta is therefore not a teaching of negation. It is a teaching of boundary.

It draws a clear line:

between world and beyond-world,
between wrong dwelling and right dwelling,
between bondage and liberation.

To identify the self with the world is death.
To identify the self with its ancestral source is freedom.
To identify the self with Nibbāna-dhātu is arrival beyond all worlds.

This is the meaning of liberation.
This is the meaning of Tathāgata.
This is why the Brahmajāla safeguards the path—not by denying the self, but by preventing it from being trapped in the wrong domain.

VIII. What the Brahmajāla Is Really Doing — Closing the World, Preserving the Exit

The Brahmajāla Sutta stands at the opening of the Canon for one decisive reason: it closes the wrong domain before the path is allowed to open.

What DN 1 Definitively Closes

DN 1 closes the door—not partially, not provisionally, but completely—to:

world–self identity,
the world as the ground of selfhood,
all metaphysical speculation that binds the self to the world (loka), whether through eternity, annihilation, finitude, infinitude, materiality, or immaterial continuity.

The sixty-two views are not rejected because they are naïve or poorly reasoned. They are rejected because they all accept the same fatal premise: that the self must be explained, secured, or completed within the world.

DN 1 declares that premise invalid.

By enclosing all such views in a single net, the Buddha makes one thing unmistakable:
no correct liberation can arise from within that field.

What DN 1 Protects by What It Excludes

By closing the world as the dwelling-ground of the self, DN 1 preserves something far more important than speculative freedom:

the possibility of right orientation,
the intelligibility of liberation,
the reality of refuge beyond the world.

Only when self–world identity is decisively ruled out do the Buddha’s later teachings become coherent rather than symbolic:

gocara becomes ancestral dwelling, not mere restraint,
brahmavihāra become non-worldly abidings, not emotions,
Nibbāna-dhātu becomes a real realm, not a metaphor,
and Tathāgata becomes one who has gone there, not one who merely thinks correctly.

DN 1 does not impoverish the path.
It makes the path possible.

The Reframed Core Teaching

The Brahmajāla does not reject the self or the view about selfhood.
It rejects the world as the ground of self-identity.

Bondage arises when:

the self is identified with the world (loka),
identity is nourished by the world,
belonging is negotiated under the law of worldly becoming.

Liberation begins when:

the worldly is no longer taken as self or part of the self,
the self ceases to dwell under the world’s jurisdiction,
orientation turns toward ancestral source and final refuge.

This is why DN 1 does not offer a “correct” metaphysical answer.
It closes the entire wrong question.

From World-Self to Deathless Refuge

Gautama Buddha’s teaching is not an erasure.
It is an exit.

Brahmavihāra refine the self beyond the world’s power-law and survival logic.
Gocara restores ancestral dwelling rather than worldly dwelling.
Nibbāna-dhātu stands as the Deathless refuge beyond all worlds.
The Tathāgata shows the direction—and completes the journey.

The Brahmajāla safeguards this path at the very beginning by ensuring one thing above all else:

that the self is never again mistaken for something that belongs to the world.

This is not nihilism.
This is not denial.
This is the protection of liberation itself.

The door to the world is closed—
so that the door to the Deathless may remain open.

Gautama Dhamma